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Abstract 
Costa Rica has some concerns for the “middle income trap” stemming from her 
perceived weakening export competitiveness, intensifying competition in attracting FDI 
inflow; and apparent lack of innovation capabilities.  Quantitative analyses on the 
impact of recent FTAs suggest only large firms benefit from FTAs suggesting the need 
for improving utilization by smaller firms.  Continuing attraction of potential MNCs 
backed by human capital development is necessary.  In pursuing its development goals, 
Costa Rica should be mindful of its reputation as an environmentally friendly place.   
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JEL Code: F15, F21, O31, O54 
 
 
Introduction 
Costa Rica has some concerns for the future growth prospects.  The doubt for 
the continuing growth performance stems from her perceived weakening export 
competitiveness, intensifying competition with other countries on attracting FDI inflow; 
and apparent lack of innovation capabilities.  These are common concerns shared 
among middle-income countries.  Then the natural question to raise is, “Is Costa Rica 
in a middle income trap?”  This paper assesses whether Costa Rica is in middle-income 
trap and how it may be able to escape from it. 
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I. The background on the interest regarding the middle-income trap 
The middle-income trap in general points to the situation where a country faces 
difficulties in smoothly shifting from growth strategies based on low labor costs to 
growth strategies based more on innovation and higher value-added activities.  This 
term has been popularized recently (Gill and Kharas 2008;Kharas and Kohli 2011), but 
the interest in the differences in growth performance among countries are not new, 
especially in terms of comparing the growth performance of East Asian and Latin 
American countries.  Since 1965, East Asian countries have collectively posted higher 
growth rates compared to Latin American countries (see Figure 1).  The divergence in 
the growth performance was the largest from 1970 to 1990.  Since then, the general 
trend in their growth pattern has been relatively similar, although still at a different 
magnitude. 
 
Figure 1: Comparison of Growth Rates in East Asia and Latin America, 1965-2011 
  
 
 
Source: Created by the author using data from World Development Indicators 
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This difference in growth performance has led to changes in their relative 
income status.  While all the countries were able to increase their real per capita 
income (measured in PPP) since 1950, the difference in growth performance led to 
changes in their relative position when ranked in descending order.  In 1950, per capita 
incomes of Central and South American countries were higher than those of East Asian 
countries, but by 2010, East Asian countries had moved ahead (see Table 1). 
 
Table 1: Ranking of real per capita income in 1950 and 2010 for selected countries in East Asia and 
Latin America 
 
1950  
 
2010 
Venezuela 7,462  Hong Kong 30,725 
Argentina  4,987  Singapore  29,038 
Uruguay 4,659  Taiwan 23,292 
Chile  3,670  Japan  21,935 
Mexico  2,365  S. Korea  21,701 
Peru  2,308  Chile  13,883 
Singapore  2,219  Uruguay 11,526 
Hong Kong 2,218  Argentina  10,256 
Colombia  2,153  Malaysia  10,094 
Guatemala 2,085  Venezuela 9,874 
Source: Bolt and van Zanden 2013 
 
This has stirred a debate on the causes of slow growth in Latin America and 
there have been a number of studies on this matter.  In the meantime, the growth 
acceleration in East Asia was heralded as a miracle (World Bank 1993).  However, the 
euphoria of East Asia did not last long.  The onset of the Asian Financial Crisis in 
1997 was a wakeup call to governments in East Asia and researchers alike to realize that 
the East Asia region was no different from other regions in terms of its vulnerability to 
crises if due care was missing to manage macroeconomic conditions (Stiglitz and Yusuf 
2001).  Even though East Asian countries have been able to recover rather quickly 
from the crisis, the growth rates have been lower than the average prevailing before the 
crisis.   
In addition, one of the characteristics of East Asian growth – the flying geese 
pattern1 – was starting to change.  The rapid growth of China is disorienting the 
formation and this has changed the mindset of policymakers in East Asia.  In the past, 
                                                 
1 This was popularized by Akamatsu (1962). 
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if one believed in the flying geese pattern of growth, then all countries would move up 
step-by-step without changing the ordering (i.e. no one will be falling behind).  It was 
as if the growth was guaranteed and their accession into the high-income categories was 
assured as occurred in the cases of Japan and Korea. However, China is likely to surpass 
other countries in the region due to its rapid and continuing growth. This means that the 
formation (or the current ordering of the income levels) is not assured and some 
countries may be left behind (achieving certain income levels later than anticipated).  
Coupled with the financial crisis in 1997, this has made the future growth prospects of 
East Asian countries uncertain. Vulnerability against crisis and the emergence of China 
contributed to the interest on future growth, and combined with the lackluster 
performance of Latin American countries in the past, the interest on the middle-income 
trap has increased in the recent years.2 
 
II. The Definition of Middle Income Trap 
Even though the interest on the middle-income trap has increased, its actual 
definition is still being debated (Im and Rosenblatt 2013).  To define the 
middle-income trap, one needs to define both the level of income that constitutes 
“middle-income” and the condition in which a country is “trapped.” 
 
Def inition of  income level 
There are two ways to define middle-income.  The first is based on absolute 
levels of income with suitable thresholds and the second is based on incomes levels 
relative to a reference country. 
If one uses the definition based on the absolute income levels, then one needs to 
specify the cutoff points for each income category.  While this is conceptually simple, 
in practice, this will lead to the choice of an exchange rate conversion factor (whether to 
use purchasing power parity (PPP), current exchange rates, etc.) and of an income 
definition (GDP versus GNI, for instance).  For instance, the World Bank defines a 
low-income country as a country with a per capita income less than US$1,005, based on 
GNI per capita using Atlas method, and a lower middle-income country as one with per 
                                                 
2 See for instance, Yusuf and Nabeshima (2009a). 
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capita income between $1,005 and $3,975; upper middle-income between $3,975 and 
$12,275; and high-income as $12,275 and above. 
In another definition, Felipe (2012) defines a low-income country as a country 
with a per capita income less than $2,000; lower middle-income as between $2,000 and 
$7,250; upper middle-income as between $7,250 and $11,750 and high-income is above 
$11,750 based on GDP per capita using 1990 PPP.   
Whichever measure is used, the implication of using an absolute level of income 
to classify countries in different income categories means that eventually a country can 
move to the high-income category as long as a country experiences positive growth on 
average. 
The definition based on relative values is based on relative income levels to a 
specific reference country, typically 50~60% of US per capita income is used as a 
reference point for the high-income category.  The use of relative income levels to 
define the threshold, means that for a country to move into the high-income category, it 
needs to grow faster than the reference country.  Compared to the case where the 
absolute income level is used, the definition based on the relative income levels requires 
much stronger growth performance in order for middle-income countries to move to the 
high-income category. 
 
The Def inition of  “Trap” 
Similar to the case of defining the income level, a trap can be defined in an 
absolute or a relative manner. If we use the absolute definition, a country is trapped if it 
can never move up from the middle-income to the high-income category. Using the 
relative definition, a country is trapped if its transition from the middle to the 
high-income category is slower than average. 
It is highly unlikely for a country to be trapped using the absolute definition. If 
the absolute definition for trap and the absolute income levels are used, then this means 
that a country can be considered trapped in the middle-income status forever if and only 
if its growth rates are non-positive in the past and in the future.  While this is certainly 
possible, it is highly unlikely given the fact that this country has achieved middle- 
income status, with some productive capacity already installed.  In contrast, the 
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absolute definition of the trap used in conjunction with a definition of relative income 
levels is more plausible.  In this case, a middle-income country failing to match the 
growth performance of a reference country will be trapped in the middle-income 
categories.   
However, it is still unclear how long a country needs to be in the middle-income 
categories or order to say that a country is “trapped” using this definition. If a country is 
in a middle-income status for 10 years and its growth performance lags relative to that 
of a reference country, it is hard to say that this country is “trapped” because we do not 
know what the future growth performance will be. It could be the case that this country 
will grow faster than the reference country in future.  In addition, the absolute 
definition will also not provide a good sense of duration of time in each income 
category.  Without this piece of information, it is hard to say if a country is “trapped” 
(i.e. stagnating) or in transition to higher income categories. 
The definition based on relative performance can provide some reasonable 
estimates regarding the duration that a typical country spends in each income category.  
In this case, a trap can be defined as a country spending more time than a typical 
country. Felipe (2012) uses an effective approach to make the assessment of the current 
situation and to predict whether a country will fall in a trap and what kind of 
performance is needed to escape from the trap. He uses the absolute income level 
categorization as described above and defines the durations for a typical country to stay 
in lower middle-income category as 28 years and upper middle-income category as 14 
years. The durations for each income category are calculated as the median years spent 
in each income category based on the data from all the countries in the past.  These 
durations imply that for a country to escape the lower middle-income trap, it needs to 
grow at 4.7% per year or faster and 3.5% per year or faster to escape from the upper 
middle-income trap. In this definition, any lower middle-income country spending more 
than 28 years in lower middle-income category is considered as being trapped.  
Similarly, upper middle-income countries spending more than 14 years without being 
able to move up are defined as being trapped. 
Using this set of definitions, those countries that are trapped and those that are in 
danger of being trapped can be identified. Table 2 lists some of the countries currently 
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trapped in lower middle-income trap.  The Philippines has stayed in this category for 
the last 34 years and is expected to stay there for 35 more years if there is no 
improvement in current growth rates.  Similarly, Brazil and South Africa have been 
trapped for quite some time.  Similarly, Table 3 lists countries in the upper 
middle-income trap.  Malaysia is currently trapped 3  and so are Uruguay and 
Venezuela. 
 
Table 2: Countries in lower middle income trap 
Country  2010GDP  Years as lower 
middle income  
Average growth 
rate (2000-2010)  
Expected years to 
upper middle  
Philippines  3,054  34  2.5  35  
Brazil  6,737  53  2.0  4 
South Africa  4,725  61  2.0  23  
Source: Felipe (2012)  
 
Table 3: Countries in upper middle income trap 
Country  2010GDP  Years as upper 
middle income  
Average growth 
rate (2000-2010)  
Expected years to 
upper income  
Malaysia  10,567  15  2.6  5  
Uruguay  10,934  15  3.3  3  
Venezuela  9,662  60  1.4  15  
Source: Felipe (2012)  
 
One of the advantages of using the definition proposed by Felipe (2012) is that it 
gives concrete criteria to assess which countries are trapped and which countries are 
expected to be trapped in future given the recent growth performance.  For instance, 
Indonesia is expected to be trapped in the lower middle-income trap.  Indonesia has 
stayed there for the last quarter century.  A typical country will spend only 28 years in 
this income category, so Indonesia has only three years to spare.  The implied growth 
rates to escape lower middle-income trap is 14.8% for the next three years, which given 
the recent growth rates, almost impossible to achieve (see Table 4).  Similarly, Costa 
Rica, Mexico, and Thailand are expected to be trapped in the upper middle-income trap 
                                                 
3 On the growth prospects of Malaysia, see for instance, Yusuf and Nabeshima (2009a;b). 
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(see Table 5).  Mexico has spent 8 years as an upper middle-income country and has 
only 6 years left to escape from being labeled as “trapped.”  However, given the recent 
growth performance of merely 0.7%, it is highly unlikely that Mexico can escape from 
this trap.  Thailand, in contrast, may have a better chance of escaping the trap.  
Actually, Thailand spent exactly 28 years in lower middle-income category, and was 
expected to spend 14 years in upper middle-income category.  This makes Thailand the 
typical country as defined by Felipe (2012). However, there is a question as to whether 
Thailand will be able to keep its growth momentum given the current political 
uncertainty.4  
 
Table 4: Countries expected to be trapped in lower middle-income trap in near future 
Country  2010GDP  Years as 
lower middle 
income  
Years left  Average growth 
rate 
(2000-2010)  
Implied 
growth rates 
needed  
Indonesia  4,790  25  3  3.9  14.8  
Source: Felipe (2012)  
 
Table 5: Countries expected to be trapped in upper middle-income trap in near future 
 
Country  2010GDP  Years as 
upper middle 
income  
Years left  Average growth 
rate 
(2000-2010)  
Implied 
growth rates 
needed  
Costa Rica  8,207  5  9  2.9  4.1  
Mexico  7,763  8  6  0.7  7.2  
Thailand  9,143  7  7  3.6  3.6  
Source: Felipe (2012)  
 
Costa Rica is also at the borderline of being trapped.  The country achieved 
upper middle-income status in 2006 and if it can manage to continue growing at 3.4% 
or higher, it can escape the upper middle-income trap, although the growth rates from 
2000-2010 were lower than the required 3.4%. The implied growth rate needed is 4.1%, 
which may prove quite difficult to achieve, especially given the fact that Costa Rica was 
                                                 
4 Anecdotal evidence suggests that some of the recent foreign direct investments in Southeast Asian 
countries specifically avoided Thailand because of political uncertainties and were diverted to other 
countries in the region. 
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previously trapped in lower middle-income trap due to slow growth. Costa Rica was 
classified as a lower middle-income country in 1952 (see Figure 2) and spent the next 
54 years in this category, mainly due to the crisis in early 1980s. Recovery from this 
crisis was slow, but it seems that Costa Rica is back on its long-term growth trend.   
 
Figure 2: Per capita growth of Costa Rica, 1950-2010 
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Source: Created by the author using data from Bolt and van Zanden 2013 
Note: Costa Rica moved from being a low-income to a lower middle-income country in 1952 and moved 
to being an upper middle-income country in 2006. 
 
For Costa Rica will need to increase its growth rate in order to escape from the 
upper middle-income trap. In order to do so, policymakers will need to assess the 
country’s current strengths and weaknesses and improve upon these.   
 
III. Assessment of Costa Rica’s strengths and weaknesses 
To assess the current strengths and weaknesses, a team from the Institute of 
Developing Economies has conducted a number of field visits to key players in Costa 
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Rica. 5   The field visits involved interviewing various government agencies, 
non-governmental organizations, educational institutes, subsidiaries of multinational 
corporations (MNCs) operating in Costa Rica, and domestic firms.  Of these, the 
subsidiaries of MNCs comprise the largest number of interviews.  Many of these 
subsidiaries of MNCs are in the electronics, IT, and medical devices industries, 
reflecting the industrial subsectors in which Costa Rica has had the most success in 
attracting foreign firms. 
 
Strengths 
Interviews with these entities reveal that there are four broad areas of strengths 
in Costa Rica: good governance and policies; location; human capital; and industrial 
agglomeration.   
 
Governance 
For many MNCs, the political and macroeconomic stability are important factors 
when making FDI decision, especially in the Central America region, where such 
fundamental conditions often are not met.  In this regard, Costa Rica fares well relative 
to other countries in the region.  The political and macroeconomic conditions in Costa 
Rica have been rather stable (although there was a debt crisis in the early 1980s).  This 
stability has certainly increased the attractiveness of Costa Rica as a suitable destination 
for foreign direct investment. 
In addition, the Ministry of Foreign Trade and CINDE are both capable and 
dedicated to the future development of Costa Rica.  Such dedication and capabilities on 
their part reminds us of those in Singapore and Penang (Malaysia).  Through these 
capable agencies, Costa Rica was able to attract key players in the electronics and 
medical device industries, which were instrumental in germinating clusters in Costa 
Rica. 
 
                                                 
5 There were two field visits conducted: from March 19 to March 23, 2012 and March 7th to March 12th, 
2013.  The field research team of IDE consisted of Kaoru Nabeshima, Kiyoyasu Tanaka, Yasushi Ito, 
Mila Kashcheeva, Hiroshi Abe, and Yukiko Aoyama.  We are grateful to the assistance provided by 
COMEX to organize meetings with these entities. 
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Location 
Many firms expressed the importance of the proximity to the U.S., both in terms 
of physical travel time and the time zone. This may be partly because some of the firms 
that have established themselves in Costa Rica tend to have less experience in the 
globalization.  It may also be because of the larger shares of services activities among 
MNCs relative to manufacturing.  The service activities performed by MNCs in Costa 
Rica, tend to be of a higher order, where decisions may need to be made rather than 
simply processing administrative tasks.  For these kinds of service activities, being in a 
same time zone seems to be a huge advantage.  In contrast, those service activities that 
do not involve complex decision-making can be outsourced to far-flung locations such 
as India where the labor cost is much lower. 
Furthermore, Costa Rica offers attractive living conditions.  Blessed with 
abundant of natural assets, Costa Rica is known for eco-tourism covering both marine 
and mountainous regions. Costa Rica is a popular destination for the young and the 
elderly alike.  This is a key attribute to attract and retain high quality human capital, 
which are instrumental in pursuing innovation oriented growth strategy.  Cities in 
Costa Rica are not yet classified as creative cities by Florida’s (2004) definition, 
however, these cities have some chance of becoming creative cities with the right mix 
of policies. 
 
Human Capital 
Interviews with MNCs reveal that the availability of human capital has enabled 
companies to branch into offering shared services for groups of firms as well as serving 
external clients either regionally or globally.  MNCs feel that the availability and 
supply of human capital at the basic level is adequate.  In addition, English language 
skills are valuable since many of the MNCs have their headquarters in the US.  
Adequate supply of English speaking workers also enabled these MNCs to branch into 
offering services activities where the language skills (both English and Spanish) are 
indispensable. 
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Agglomeration 
The initial success in attracting some of the leading firm in electronics, IT, and 
medical devices is creating somewhat of a reputation effect, which is making Costa Rica 
an attractive location for other firms. From the discussion with MNCs in the medical 
devices industry, relative to other industries, the medical device industry seems to be less 
globalized in general. This means that the global supply chain in the medical device 
industry is still in its formation stage and Costa Rica can take advantage of this 
opportunity before other countries raise their hands.  As more firms in downstream 
(mainly conducting assembly operations) are investing in Costa Rica, firms upstream 
are also being attracted to invest in Costa Rica and in fact, some of them have 
established their operations in Costa Rica.  Once they establish their operations, more 
downstream firms are attracted to Costa Rica since more of the tasks along the supply 
chain can be done in Costa Rica.  To create a viable cluster, this kind of virtuous cycle 
of investment needs to happen, and it seems that Costa Rica is at the initial stage of this 
cycle.  In all, there are nine industries where agglomerations are identified in Costa 
Rica.6 
 
Table 6: Agglomerations in Costa Rica 
Industry  Cantons  
Textiles  San José in San José Province  
Wearing apparel  Montes de Oca and Pérez Zeledón in San José Province, San 
Ramón in Alajuela Province and Cartago in Cartago Province  
Wood and wood products  San Ramón and San Carlos in Alajuela Province  
Printing and reproduction of recorded 
media  Goicoechea and Tibasm in San José Province  
Chemical and chemical products  Curridabat in San José Province  
Fabricated metal products  Desamparados in San José Province  
Computer, electronic and optical 
products  Heredia in Heredia Province  
Furniture  Desamparados, Goicoechea in San José Province, Palmares 
and Valverde Vega in Alajuela Province  
                                                 
6 For the details on the agglomeration of industrial activities in Costa Rica, please see Kumagai and 
others (2014). 
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Repair and installation of machinery 
and equipment  Heredia in Heredia Province  
Source: Kumagai and others 2014 
 
Weaknesses 
While a number of strengths were identified above, there were also some areas 
that warrant further attention.  These are: lack of local linkages and local industry 
development; concerns on the supply and quality of human capital; deficiencies in 
physical infrastructure; and absence of similar countries in the region. 
 
Lack of local linkages and local industry development 
While MNCs shifting into service activities may be taken as a positive move 
(providing higher paid employment), there are some concerns that this shift to services 
may be partly a reflection of lack of expandability in manufacturing activities.  If so, 
should Costa Rica be content with this situation, especially considering the fact that 
service industries tends to have much less linkages with other firms (i.e. much less scope 
for backwards linkages with domestic industries)?  If the goal is to encourage the 
development of indigenous firms, especially in manufacturing activities, shift of MNCs 
activities too much into services directions may not be desirable. 
This (potential) lack of expandability in manufacturing (especially from the 
viewpoint of MNCs) stems from still too thin industrialization in Costa Rica. From the 
discussion, development of local support industries is not forthcoming.  While some 
local firms have emerged as suppliers to MNCs, many others have not.  It seems that the 
level of industrialization is still too thin for local linkages to form organically.  While 
the attention to attract medical device industries to Costa Rica seems to be success and 
more firms in this particular sector seems to be agglomerating in Costa Rica, this has 
not translated into emergence of local industries.  This may be because this industry 
tends to have smaller volumes and sometimes have more specialized input needs.  This 
is making it more difficult for indigenous firms to develop as suppliers because 1) the 
technological and managerial capabilities are far removed from the requirements of 
MNCs; and/or 2) the required investment in equipment (or changes in business 
practices) is larger relative to the potential pool of customers.  
14 
 
 
Future supply and quality of human capital 
While many MNCs praised the current availability of human capital, many also 
voiced concerns regarding future availability of necessary skills. This partly reflects the 
success by Costa Rica to attract more FDI into the country.  However, a continual 
increase in the presence of FDI firms is leading to competition for workers at all levels: 
operators, technicians, engineers, and management.  Since the availability of qualified 
personnel has been the key attractiveness of Costa Rica, educational institutes, 
government, and private sector need to work with each other to ensure that supply of 
human capital does not become a bottleneck to attracting more FDI.  Such steady flow 
of human capital would also to some extent lessen the pressures on wages so that Costa 
Rica can enjoy the cost advantage relative to other countries for a little longer.   
While ensuring enough supply of human capital is an important issue, Costa 
Rica needs to start paying more attention to quality of education.  Currently the quality 
of lower level education (including technical education) seems to be adequate.  
However, looking into future, the most valuable asset of Costa Rica would be high 
quality human capital.  Raising quality of tertiary education, especially of research 
would typically require a long gestation period.  Initiating actions right now seems to 
be fruitful, although such efforts needs to be highly selective and focused on only a 
university or even a handful of departments. 
Many MNCs expressed their desires to embark on more R&D related activities 
in Costa Rica.  However, they have not done so yet because of the lack of human 
capital, especially with tertiary and above degrees in statistics, materials and biomedical 
sciences, and good understanding on GMP.  This is reflected in still low level of 
innovation outputs in Costa Rica (more on the innovation capability will be discussed in 
a later section).  Further emphasis on this area as well as improving the availability and 
quality of human capital in Costa Rica would need to be pursued as a nucleus of 
long-term growth strategy.  By doing so, Costa Rica can improve its position as an 
attractive location for investment even when wages are rising. 
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Deficiencies in physical infrastructure 
Interviews with firms pointed out some deficiencies in the provision of 
infrastructure.  The quality of road transport and utility (the price of electricity) seem to 
be high on the minds of business firms.  If Costa Rica is to pursue an export-oriented 
strategy (especially manufactured goods), then transportation and logistics infrastructure 
needs to be in good conditions.  This is especially so for the seaport facilities.  
Currently the deficiency in this is glaring and it needs to be revamped significantly to 
stay competitive. 
These problems are all addressed in a plan to build new container terminal by 
APM Terminals.  Definitely Costa Rica needs to upgrade its port facilities and the new 
plan by APM Terminals is suitable to do so.  It will provide a manmade shield to 
ensure the safety of ships under most weather conditions, will provide deeper ports for 
larger ships to be able to dock, will provide electrical outlets for refrigerated containers, 
and will provide expanded container yards, and will be equipped with more cranes.  
All of these are in place to address the current shortcomings.  It is also commendable 
that the new port will be developed on reclaimed land so as to minimize the 
environmental impacts of new port development. 
If the plan moves smoothly, the new terminal will be successful mainly because 
it will be a replacement of Port of Limon for container handling despite the rather high 
handling fee.  Even if the seaports are expanded through the APM terminal project,7 
other complementary investment in infrastructure is necessary to take full advantage of 
this expansion.  Especially of importance are the improvements in road and railroad 
infrastructure.  Currently the main conduit connecting San Jose and Limon is Route 
32.  However, the capacity of the road is rather limited.  Expansion of this route is 
needed.  In addition, rehabilitation of railroad for freight use could be also explored.  
By doing so, it would be able to alleviate some of the congestions experienced on Route 
32. 
                                                 
7 Another project, the AMEGA project focuses on the transshipment business, which is expected to 
generate 1,000 employment when in operation.  If this project proceeds and is successful, then this will 
create additional need to develop transportation infrastructure linking APM terminal and AMEGA project 
along the coast lines of Moin.  If such situation develops, care need to be paid to environmental impacts 
as well as devising the most cost effective way to transport containers between these two terminals. 
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Given that in many other countries, new port developments are almost always 
combined with development of an industrial estate near the port, Costa Rica should also 
explore the possible establishment of export-oriented industrial zones near the new 
container terminal.  This will significantly reduce costs associated with logistics, 
especially given the current limitation on the road capacity. Furthermore, this would 
lead to employment generation.  That should assist a smoother transition from Limon 
port to the APM terminal, which would employ only about 700 people when in 
operation.   
In addition to the improvements in seaport capacity, the airport capacity also 
needs to be expanded in future.  Given that the current location does not offer any 
opportunity for further expansion, a new location needs to be identified.  Expansion of 
the airport should be also complemented by the effort to increase direct flights to major 
markets so as to offer opportunities to expand the direct cargoes in the belly. 
These investments in above-mentioned hard infrastructure need to be 
complemented by continuing investments in soft infrastructure.  These include 
improvements in the system used by the Custom agency and also the number of 
agricultural inspectors.  From the interview, it is apparent that many have appreciated 
the new system introduced by the General Directorate of Customs.  However, there 
have been many complaints about instability of the system, especially during the 
weekend.  Since many exporters prepare their documents and arrange for shipping 
during the weekends, the system needs to improve its stability so that it will be 
continuously available during the weekends. 
In addition, some concerns on the lack of the number of agricultural inspectors 
were voiced.  Given that agriculture and horticulture exports are important to Costa 
Rica, alleviating this bottleneck is needed if the expectation is to increase the exports of 
these commodities. 
Likewise, energy policy is an important element of industrial policy and 
increasingly environmental policy.  How to manage the increase in energy demand 
commensurate with rising income will likely to influence future course of development 
in Costa Rica.  With the growth of an economy and with expansion of seaports and 
export activities, the demand for energy, especially of electricity will only increase.  
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To increase the electricity supply, continuous investments in electricity generation is 
needed.  Costa Rica should be mindful of maintaining its green image and such 
expansion of electricity capacity should be met mainly from renewable sources.  In 
addition, if Costa Rica’s government is considering this opportunity as a way in which 
to develop local capabilities in renewable energy sector, more attention could be paid to 
the development of ocean energy.  The technology for ocean energy is not yet firmly 
established and because of this, there is still room for domestic firms to enter this sector, 
relative to other renewable sources such as solar and wind where the industry is already 
entrenched by incumbent MNCs. 
From discussions with these key stakeholders, it is apparent that Costa Rica 
would need to invest significantly on physical infrastructure in order to maintain and to 
improve its export competitiveness.  However, at the same time, Costa Rica needs to 
be rather careful in choosing the right partners so as not to tarnish her reputation as 
environmentally friendly and conscious country.  By far, this is the most competitive 
asset that Costa Rica possesses.  The need to invest in infrastructure has to be balanced 
with considerations regarding sustainability and environmental impact.  This may 
result in investment being more expensive upfront compared to alternatives.  However, 
if such infrastructure project lead to significant negative environmental impacts, it could 
significantly tarnish the reputation of Costa Rica as a green country and regaining the 
good reputation would be hard if not impossible.  If Costa Rica loses its reputation as 
an eco-friendly and conscious country, it will be just another small “brown” country and 
lose its distinctiveness.  This will have large negative impacts on tourism and also on 
the attractiveness of Costa Rica for foreign direct investment (FDI).  Therefore, it is 
advisable for Costa Rica to choose reputable and environmentally conscious partners for 
infrastructure development projects. 
 
Absence of similar countries in the region 
Even though Costa Rica enjoys an advantage conferred from its geographical 
location, one missing element is an absence of suitable partner countries in the region.  
Because of this, it will be quite difficult for Costa Rica to make significant inroads into 
more established high-volume production networks such as electronics (broadly defined, 
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including semiconductors).  There are two reasons for this assessment.  First, the 
supply chain associated with electronics is well-developed and much of this is located in 
East Asia.  As a diversification strategy of MNCs, they may decide to locate some of 
the production facility to Costa Rica or other countries in Latin America.  However, 
such flow would be small.  Secondly, Costa Rica is currently relatively isolated in 
terms of geographical location.  While in terms of pure geographical terms, Costa Rica 
is well situated, in terms of regional production networks, Costa Rica is, at least 
currently, a lone player, dealing directly with major markets (the U.S. and EU) in both 
imports of necessary inputs and exports of (semi-)finished goods.  There are no other 
countries in vicinity that are taking part of the production network that Costa Rica 
belongs to, with perhaps Mexico as an exception in some cases.  This is a stark 
contrast to the shape of production networks in East Asia where many countries in the 
region tend to participate in some stages of production. 
 
What can be done? 
Costa Rica will need to fully utilize its potential to export based on the 
locational advantage and attractiveness to foreign direct investment as well as 
improvements in innovation capabilities.  One way to improve her trade performance 
is to use free trade agreements effectively.  In fact, Costa Rica has embarked on 
adopting free trade agreements in recent years and the next section examines their 
impacts. 
 
IV. The impact of free trade agreement implemented by Costa Rica 
Costa Rica is a small open middle-income economy that largely depends on 
exports for its growth. To promote exports, the Costa Rican government negotiated a 
number of FTAs with its main trade partners. The first free trade agreement (FTA) signed 
in 1963 with the countries of Central America and the two of the most recent FTAs are the 
Dominican Republic-Central America FTA (DR-CAFTA)8 and the FTA with China, 
signed in 2009 in 2011 respectively. Table 7 lists the FTA partners and the dates of 
agreements. 
                                                 
8 On DR-CAFTA, see Jaramillo and Lederman (2006). 
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Table 7: A list of free trade agreement implemented by Costa Rica 
Name of FTA Year of FTA Date of FTA Country name 
Central America 1963  Costa Rica Central America 1963  El Salvador Central America 1963  Nicaragua Central America 1963  Guatemala Central America 1963  Honduras Mexico 1995  Mexico Canada 2002  Canada Chile 2002  Chile Dominican Republic 2002  Dominican Republic Caricom 2005  Antigua and Barbuda Caricom 2005  Barbados Caricom 2005  St. Kitts and Nevis Caricom 2005  Trinidad and Tobago Caricom 2005  Belize Caricom 2005  St. Lucia Caricom 2005  Grenada Caricom 2005  Dominica Caricom 2005  Guyana Caricom 2005  Jamaica Caricom 2005  St. Vincent and the Grenadines Caricom 2005  Suriname Panama 2008  Panama DR-CAFTA 2009 Jan. 1st Costa Rica 
DR-CAFTA 2009 Jan. 1st El Salvador 
DR-CAFTA 2009 Jan. 1st Nicaragua 
DR-CAFTA 2009 Jan. 1st Guatemala 
DR-CAFTA 2009 Jan. 1st Honduras 
DR-CAFTA 2009 Jan. 1st Dominican Republic 
DR-CAFTA 2009 Jan. 1st United States 
China 2011 Aug. 1st China 
 
 
This section attempts to quantify the effects of these two most recent FTAs on the 
export patterns of Costa Rican firms. We use the export data at the 
firm-destination-product level over the period of 2008-2012 obtained from 
PROCOMER, the export promotion agency of Costa Rica, to test whether Costa Rica’s 
(i) export flows to the Dominican Republic and Central America increased after the 
implementation of the DR-CAFTA in 2009; (ii) export flows to China increased after the 
implementation of FTA with China in 2011; (iii) firms or industries experience 
heterogeneous effects from these two FTAs.  
We employ the difference-in-difference estimation strategy to the traditional gravity 
model of international trade to be able to compare Costa Rican export flows to its FTA 
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partners pre- and post- FTA implementation with the export flows to other countries pre- 
and post- FTA implementation. We use two different underlying estimators under the 
difference-in-difference framework, the traditional OLS estimator and the Poisson 
pseudo-maximum-likelihood (PPML) estimator, to be able to control for zero export 
flows.  
Our main empirical result suggests that the implementation of DR-CAFTA in 2009 
increased export volume to the partner countries only for relatively large Costa Rican 
exporters (with larger than the median value of employment size), while the FTA with 
China in 2011 did not seem to benefit Costa Rican exporters, at least within a year after its 
implementation.  
Our empirical results are based on a relatively short panel of export data, the years of 
2008-2012, which makes it empirically hard to capture the full effects of these two most 
recent FTAs. To estimate the longer term effects of DR-CAFTA and the FTA with China 
and to evaluate the effects of the earlier FTAs the panel needs to be extended to include 
the previous years as well as the latest years of trade data. Also, within the analyzed 
period, the Costa Rican economy experienced the repercussions of the global financial 
crisis of 2008 as most of the world economies. The export flows by Costa Rican firms 
contracted by more than 2% in 2008 and more than 6% in 2009, resulting in the 1% 
decline of GDP growth rate in 2009 (see Table 8 for the exports and GDP values of Costa 
Rica in real terms), which makes it even harder to capture the effects of the two most 
recent FTAs within the analyzed period, despite attempts to control for the crisis.   
The next section describes the data used in this study, followed by the discussion on 
our analysis and concluding remarks.  
 
Table 8: Real export and real GDP values 
Year Export in constant 2005 bil. USD 
Export growth in 
constant 2005 USD 
GDP in constant 
2005 bil. USD 
GDP growth in 
constant 2005 USD 
2008 11.50 -2.01% 24.08 2.73% 
2009 10.81 -6.02% 23.84 -1.02% 
2010 11.41 5.54% 25.02 4.95% 
2011 12.10 6.07% 26.13 4.43% 
2012 13.13 8.49% 27.47 5.13% 
Source: the World Bank’s WDI database.  
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Data 
The data for this study is provided by PROCOMER, the export promotion agency 
of Costa Rica, which support the work of the Ministry of Foreign Trade. The original 
firm-level dataset includes export flows from Costa Rican firms over the period of 
2008-2012, differentiated by a destination country and the 8-digit Harmonized System 
(HS) codes for the export products. We choose to structure our data at the 
firm-destination-product level to be able to utilize the number of firm-specific 
characteristics included in the original PROCOMER’s dataset. We will include such 
firm-specific characteristics as the level of a firm’s employment and the number of 
business years in our empirical gravity model to account for the firm’s size and age. Firms 
that are larger or more mature may choose different export strategies compared to smaller 
or younger firms.  
Table 3 shows our main variable, the export flows by Costa Rican firms, aggregated 
by year. This table also compares PROCOMER’s export flows with the publicly available 
BoP’s annual export of goods and services (in current USD dollars) from the World 
Bank’s WDI database. Given that the data from PROCOMER includes only the firms 
from the special economic zones in Costa Rica, we expect the aggregated export flows 
from PROCOMER to be smaller than the WB’s export values. Indeed, the annual export 
values in PROCOMER’s dataset are smaller by approximately 10% on average compared 
to the World Bank’s WDI annual export values, but notably the annual changes in the 
export flows follow the same dynamics9.  
 
Table 9: Nominal export values 
Year Export in current bil. USD (PROCOMER) Export in current bil. USD (WDI) 
2008 9.57 10.17 
2009 8.62 9.67 
2010 9.47 10.60 
2011 10.38 11.58 
                                                 
9 For the detailed description of PROCOMER’s export data see Lederman, Rodriguez-Clare and Xu 
(2010). 
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2012 11.35 12.73 
Total 49.39 54.74 
Source: PROCOMER’s data and the World Bank’s WDI database.  
 
Table 10 presents the export values by Costa Rican industries in 2008-2012. The 
Manufacturing industry as a whole exported almost 29 billion USD of products within 
this period, or approximately 60% of the total value of exports by Costa Rican firms over 
the period of 2008-2012. The other two largest exporting industries are Agriculture, 
forestry and fishing with 13% of total export value and Wholesale and retail with 9% of 
total export value within 2008-2012.  
 
Table 10: Export by Industry for 2008-2012 
Industry Export in bil. USD Share of total export 
Manufacturing 28.87  58.44% 
Agriculture, forestry and fishing 6.40  12.97% 
Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles and 
motorcycles 4.47  9.06% 
Professional, scientific and technical activities 0.57  1.15% 
Water supply; sewerage, waste management and remediation 
activities 0.13  0.26% 
Other service activities 0.13  0.26% 
Construction 0.09  0.19% 
Administrative and support service activities 0.07  0.14% 
Information and communication 0.06  0.12% 
Transportation and storage 0.04  0.09% 
Financial and insurance activities 0.03  0.05% 
Human health and social work activities 0.01  0.02% 
Mining and quarrying 0.01  0.02% 
Education 0.01  0.01% 
Real estate activities 0.00  0.00% 
Accommodation and food service activities 0.00  0.00% 
Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply 0.00  0.00% 
Arts, entertainment and recreation 0.00  0.00% 
Public administration and defense; compulsory social security 0.00  0.00% 
Activities of households as employers; undifferentiated goods- and 
services-producing activities of households for own use 0.00  0.00% 
Activities of extraterritorial organizations and bodies 0.00  0.00% 
Source: PROCOMER’s data 
 
Table 11 further shows the shares of exporting industries within the Manufacturing 
industry as a whole.  Manufacture of computer, electronic and optical products is the 
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biggest exporting industry in Costa Rica in 2008-2012 with almost 15% of total export 
value within 2008-2012.  
 
Table 11: Export by Manufacturing Industry for 2008-2012 
Industry Export in bil. USD  
Manufacture of computer, electronic and optical products 7.20 14.57% 
Other manufacturing 5.66 11.46% 
Manufacture of food products 5.30 10.74% 
Manufacture of rubber and plastics products 1.90 3.84% 
Manufacture of electrical equipment 1.86 3.76% 
Manufacture of wearing apparel 0.90 1.82% 
Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products 0.90 1.81% 
Manufacture of paper and paper products 0.82 1.65% 
Manufacture of basic pharmaceutical products and pharmaceutical 
preparations 0.69 1.40% 
Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except machinery and 
equipment 0.68 1.37% 
Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products 0.65 1.31% 
Manufacture of basic metals 0.56 1.13% 
Manufacture of beverages 0.29 0.58% 
Manufacture of textiles 0.26 0.53% 
Manufacture of leather and related products 0.23 0.47% 
Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 0.18 0.36% 
Printing and reproduction of recorded media 0.12 0.24% 
Manufacture of wood and of products of wood and cork, except furniture; 
manufacture of articles of straw and plaiting materials 0.08 0.16% 
Manufacture of furniture 0.06 0.13% 
Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c. 0.05 0.10% 
Manufacture of other transport equipment 0.01 0.03% 
Manufacture of tobacco products 0.00 0.01% 
Manufacture of coke and refined petroleum products 0.00 0.00% 
Source: PROCOMER’s data 
 
To evaluate the impact of the FTAs on the export flows by Costa Rican firms, we 
constructed two dummy variables, for the DR-CAFTA partners and for the FTA with 
China based on the information in Table 1. Since our main variable, the export flows by 
Costa Rican firms, is available only within the period of 2008-2012, we cannot estimate 
the effects of the FTAs ratified before the year of 2008. Nevertheless, to analyze whether 
these countries as a group receive higher export volumes in 2008-2012 compared to the 
rest of the export destination countries, we also construct the dummy variable for the FTA 
partners before 2008 and include it in our gravity model.   
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Table 12 and Table 13 provide additional information about the export patterns of the 
FTA partners of Costa Rica. The DR-CAFTA partner countries as a group received the 
largest volume of exports from Costa Rica in 2008-2012, while export to China has been 
undertaken by the largest firms in our sample. The average export volume to China by 
Costa Rican companies is almost 4 million USD a year, while the average export volume 
to other FTA partners is approximately 0.5 million USD a year10.  
 
Table 12: Export to FTA partners for 2008-2012 
FTA Year in effect 
Export in bil. USD by Year 
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Total 
China 2011 0.68 0.77 0.29 0.20 0.33 2.26 
DR-CAFTA 2009 4.91 4.25 5.08 5.54 6.07 25.85 
Panama 2008 0.41 0.44 0.45 0.58 0.58 2.45 
Caricom 2005 0.14 0.13 0.15 0.11 0.12 0.65 
Dominican Republic 2002 0.23 0.19 0.24 0.16 0.20 1.02 
Chile 2002 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.13 
Canada 2002 0.05 0.05 0.08 0.09 0.07 0.35 
Mexico 1995 0.24 0.20 0.25 0.32 0.32 1.33 
Central America 1963 1.31 1.14 1.36 1.50 1.59 6.90 
Source: PROCOMER’s data 
 
Table 13: Average Export Volume at the Firm level by FTA partners for 2008-2012 
FTA Year in effect 
Export in mil. USD by Year 
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Total 
China 2011 6.30 8.34 2.38 1.58 2.47 3.91 
DR-CAFTA 2009 1.11 1.00 0.99 1.08 1.16 1.07 
Panama 2008 0.49 0.48 0.39 0.45 0.47 0.45 
Caricom 2005 0.34 0.32 0.33 0.30 0.31 0.32 
Dominican Republic 2002 0.82 0.68 0.76 0.53 0.63 0.68 
Chile 2002 0.20 0.18 0.28 0.16 0.18 0.20 
Canada 2002 0.27 0.21 0.34 0.36 0.26 0.29 
Mexico 1995 0.91 0.76 0.72 0.97 0.95 0.86 
Central America 1963 0.47 0.43 0.44 0.49 0.51 0.47 
Source: PROCOMER’s data 
 
To build our final panel dataset we combine the firm-level data from PROCOMER 
with the dummy variables for the FTA partners as well as the country-level characteristics 
                                                 
10 See Table 1 of the Appendix for the export volumes to all trade partners of Costa Rica. The FTA partners 
are marked in grey.  
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about GDP, population, distance, and continuity. The traditional gravity control variables 
are obtained from the CEPII dataset.11  
 
Empirical Analysis 
The purpose of the empirical analysis is to test whether Costa Rica’s (i) export 
flows to the Dominican Republic and Central America increased after the implementation 
of the DR-CAFTA in 2009; (ii) export flows to China increased after the implementation 
of the FTA with China in 2011; (iii) firms or industries experience heterogeneous effects 
from these two FTAs.  
We adopt the difference-in-differences approach and combine it with the standard 
gravity model to test our hypotheses. Applied to the issue of FTA effect on export pattern, 
difference-in-difference approach suggests that one compares the export pattern among 
FTA partner countries pre- and post- FTA implementation with the export pattern among 
control countries pre- and post- FTA implementation. The role of FTA is identified as the 
estimated difference in difference of trade volumes pre- and post- FTA implementation 
between the two groups of countries.  
Based on the standard gravity model (1), the value of exports from Costa Rica to 
country  in year , denoted by  is proportional to the product of the two countries’ 
GDPs, denoted by  and  and is inversely proportional to , the distance 
between the CR and the other country: 
(1) , 
where , ,  and are unknown parameters, and  is an error term. We 
apply the difference-in-difference method to the gravity model (1) by including the 
dummy variable for the FTA treatment group, , the dummy variable for the 
post- FTA years, , as well as the interaction of these two dummies, 
                                                 
11 The CEPII dataset can be accessed via:  
http://www.cepii.fr/CEPII/en/bdd_modele/presentation.asp?id=8 
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. We also include the vector of firm-specific characteristics (the 
age of a firm and its employment level), , to obtain our baseline estimation equation: 
(2) 
, 
Provided  is strictly positive, we can log-linearize the above equation to obtain 
our main specification, the linear gravity equation for the firm-level panel data: 
(3)  
. 
Our coefficient of interest is  and it measures the impact of the FTA (either 
DR-CAFTA or the FTA with China) on the log of the value of exports by Costa Rican 
firms to its FTA partners. If  is positive and significant, the export volume from Costa 
Rica to its FTA partners increase after the implementation of the FTA .  
Given that equation (3) can only be used to estimate regressions with strictly positive 
non-zero exports, we also use the Poisson pseudo-maximum-likelihood estimator 
(PPML) proposed by Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) to estimate the equation (2), so 
that zero exports can also be included in our analysis.  
While the PPML estimates are consistent even in the presence of heteroscedasticity, if 
certain exports are incorrectly reported as zeros, the PPML estimates may be biased. 
Moreover, the interpretation of the coefficients on the interaction terms in the PPML 
model is not straightforward. Thus, we report both OLS and PPML estimates. To be able 
to compare the estimation results based on these two methods we need to keep the 
number of observations equal in both OLS and PPML samples. We choose to transform 
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the OLS sample to include zeros as well by adding one to the export volumes before 
taking the log.  
 
 Firm- and industry-level heterogeneity of the treatment effect of DR-CAFTA  
Table 14 presents the OLS and the PPML estimation results for the DR-CAFTA 
implemented in 2009. Firstly, we report the OLS and PPML estimates in Column (1) and 
Column (4) without including any firm-specific characteristics or other gravity control 
variables to compare the performance of these two estimators on the largest possible 
sample with all the zero export values included. Given that the coefficients on the 
interaction terms in the PPML model cannot be interpreted literally, we further focus on 
interpreting the OLS estimates, but include the PPML results as a robustness check.  
In Column (2) we estimate our main linear gravity equation (3) and include the 
firm-level characteristics (the log of employment and the years of business) as well as the 
standard gravity control variables (GDP, population, distance, contiguity and the 
language). The number of observations drops significantly, from more than 3 million 
observations in the OLS regression in Column (1) to approximately 1.4 million 
observations in the regression in Column (2). This is because there are a lot of missing 
values in the  variable. 
Our coefficient of interest on the interaction term, , is 
negative and statistically significant, which implies that the implementation of 
DR-CAFTA decreased the export volume of the average Costa Rican firm to the 
DR-CAFTA partner countries since 2009. Another way to interpret this finding is that 
while some exporting firms increased their exports following DR-CAFTA, other firms 
decreased their export volume, such that the total effect is negative. The PPML estimates 
in Column (5) support this finding.  
To test for this heterogeneous response by exporting firms to the implementation of 
DR-CAFTA we analyze whether the treatment effect of DR-CAFTA differs depending 
on a firm’s size (measured as the log of employment). We thus include the triple 
interaction term,  in our main 
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specification (3). The results of the extended model are presented in Column (3) of Table 
14. 
 
Table 14: Difference-in-Difference Estimate for CAFTA 
Dependent variable: log of export for OLS and Export for PPML 
Variable OLS (1) 
OLS 
(2) 
OLS 
(3) 
PPML 
(4) 
PPML 
(5) 
PPML 
(6) 
Years after CAFTA -0.010*** -0.0012 -0.0082 -0.19* 0.29 0.29 
 (0.0026) (0.0056) (0.0054) (0.074) (0.16) (0.16) 
CAFTA 1.94*** 1.81*** 1.81*** 4.30*** 1.72*** 1.72*** 
 (0.038) (0.059) (0.059) (0.23) (0.21) (0.21) Post × CAFTA -0.29*** -0.26*** -2.16*** 0.025 -0.19 -0.75** 
 (0.027) (0.047) (0.15) (0.079) (0.12) (0.28) FTA partners before 2008 0.093*** -0.0098 -0.0096 -1.71*** 0.43* 0.43* 
 (0.0098) (0.012) (0.012) (0.30) (0.20) (0.20) 
Log of employment - 0.095*** 0.073*** - 0.93*** 0.88*** 
 - (0.0068) (0.0061) - (0.078) (0.086) 
Years of business  - 0.00022 0.00022 - -0.0079 -0.0080 
 - 
(0.00049
) 
(0.00049
) - 
(0.0056
) 
(0.0056
) 
Log of GDP - 0.095*** 0.095*** - 1.02*** 1.02*** 
 - (0.0039) (0.0039) - (0.079) (0.079) 
Log of population - -0.0058** 
-0.0058*
* - 
-0.50**
* 
-0.50**
* 
 - (0.0019) (0.0019) - (0.089) (0.089) 
Log of distance - -0.22*** -0.22*** - -0.95*** 
-0.95**
* 
 - (0.0080) (0.0080) - (0.18) (0.18) 
Contiguity - 1.86*** 1.86*** - 0.85*** 0.85*** 
 - (0.057) (0.057) - (0.23) (0.23) 
Spanish language - -0.12*** -0.12*** - 0.30 0.30 
 - (0.015) (0.015) - (0.18) (0.18) Post × CAFTA × Log of 
employment - - 0.52*** - - 0.092 
 - - (0.037) - - (0.053) 
Constant 0.11*** -0.47*** -0.39*** 9.19*** -5.54*** -5.26** 
 (0.0038) (0.079) (0.080) (0.37) (1.66) (1.71) 
Number of observations 3210420 1399665 1399665 3210420 
139966
5 
139966
5 
R-squared 0.063 0.12 0.13 - - - 
Standard errors in parentheses       
* p<0.05  ** p<0.01  *** p<0.001" 
 
Importantly, both interaction terms are significant in the extended specification which 
signifies a good addition to the model. To interpret the coefficient on the triple interaction 
29 
 
term and see if the size of a firm matters in realizing the beneficial effects of DR-CAFTA 
we calculate the derivative of the underlying equation in Column (3) with respect to the 
DR-CAFTA treatment and evaluate it at the post- FTA implementation years (i.e., 
). Thus, we get the following equation: 
 . Using the information 
on the distribution of the  variable from Table 15, we then 
calculate the treatment effect of DR-CAFTA at different employment levels to check the 
sign and the magnitude of the derivative.  
 
Table 15: The distribution of the Log of employment 
    
Percentiles Smallest   
1%               0 0   
5%           1.386 0   
10%          1.946 0 Obs. 40422 
25%          3.045 0 Sum of Wgt.. 40422 
    
50%          4.263  Mean 4.215 
 Largest Std. Dev. 1.755 
75%          5.525 9.146   
90%          6.479 9.146 Variance 3.082 
95%          6.921 9.146 Skewness -0.150 
99%          8.007 9.146 Kurtosis 2.667 
Source: PROCOMER’s data 
 
Based on this exercise, the firms with the log of employment larger than 4.263 (i.e., 
the 50th percentile of the Log of Employment distribution) increased their export flows 
following the implementation of the DR-CAFTA in 2009. While interpretation of the 
coefficients on the interaction terms is not straightforward in PPML, the estimates are 
qualitatively similar, and therefore support the finding that larger firms benefited from the 
implementation of DR-CAFTA, while smaller firms decrease their export flows. 
Table 16 further explores the heterogeneous effects from the DR-CAFTA between 
the exporting industries. To construct this table we estimate our preferred linear gravity 
equation (3), but we do it separately for all the exporting Costa Rican industries. We then 
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report only the industries that have the significant coefficient, , on the interaction term, 
. As Table 16 shows, some exporting industries expanded after the 
DR-CAFTA, while other industries that are export to the DR-CAFTA partners contracted 
significantly after 2009.  
 
Table 16: Difference-in-Difference Estimate for CAFTA 
Sector description Coefficient estimate Standard error 
Other professional, scientific and technical activities 4.101 1.148 
Scientific research and development 2.624 1.204 
Real estate activities 2.070 0.883 
Education 1.864 0.943 
Programming and broadcasting activities 1.732 0.651 
Manufacture of beverages 1.644 0.585 
Manufacture of computer, electronic and optical products 1.142 0.480 
Retail trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles 0.797 0.331 
Wholesale trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles -0.354 0.142 
Warehousing and support activities for transportation -1.645 0.575 
Construction of buildings -2.431 0.917 
Information service activities -2.534 0.095 
Employment activities -2.765 1.030 
Other personal service activities -4.038 1.838 
Air transport -4.538 0.821 
Note: The table includes the sectors which show statistically significant estimates after the OLS 
regressions. 
 
 The FTA with China did not affect the majority of Costa Rican exporters to China 
Similarly to the previous table for the DR-CAFTA treatment, Table 17 presents 
the OLS and the PPML estimates for the FTA with China implemented in 2011. The 
coefficient on the interaction term, , in Column (2) is positive, 
but not significant. We interpret it that the average Costa Rican firm that exports to China 
does not benefit from this FTA implementation. This finding is robust to the alternative 
PPML estimation strategy, presented in Column (5).  
 
Table 17: Difference-in-Difference Estimate for China FTA 
Dependent variable: log of export for OLS and Export for PPML 
Variable OLS (1) 
OLS 
(2) 
OLS 
(3) 
PPML 
(4) 
PPML 
(5) 
PPML 
(6) 
Years after China FTA -0.019** 0.017** 0.017** -0.021 0.24 0.24 
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* 
 (0.0024) (0.0052) (0.0052) (0.040) (0.13) (0.13) 
China 0.16*** -0.28*** -0.28*** 2.44*** -0.21 -0.21 
 (0.022) (0.034) (0.034) (0.71) (0.39) (0.39) Post× China 0.023 0.024 -0.074 -0.96*** 1.16 -1.44 
 (0.020) (0.034) (0.11) (0.21) (0.65) (1.07) 
FTA partners before 2008 0.48*** 0.17*** 0.17*** 0.82** 0.23 0.23 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.28) (0.18) (0.18) 
Log of employment - 0.096*** 0.096*** - 0.93*** 0.93*** 
 - (0.0069) (0.0068) - (0.079) (0.077) 
Years of business  - 0.00019 0.00019 - -0.0083 -0.0083 
 - (0.00049) (0.00049) - (0.0058) (0.0058) 
Log of GDP - 0.092*** 0.092*** - 0.98*** 0.98*** 
 - (0.0039) (0.0039) - (0.069) (0.069) 
Log of population - 0.044*** 0.044*** - -0.28*** -0.28*** 
 - (0.0023) (0.0023) - (0.081) (0.081) 
Log of distance - -0.37*** -0.37*** - -1.91*** -1.91*** 
 - (0.0096) (0.0096) - (0.14) (0.14) 
Contiguity - 1.97*** 1.97*** - 0.023 0.023 
 - (0.058) (0.058) - (0.21) (0.21) 
Spanish language - -0.063*** 
-0.063**
* - -0.80*** -0.80*** 
 - (0.015) (0.015) - (0.20) (0.20) Post × China × Log of 
employment - - 0.028 - - 0.40 
 - - (0.029) - - (0.22) 
Constant 0.12*** 0.17* 0.17* 9.45*** 0.85 0.88 
 (0.0034) (0.081) (0.081) (0.25) (1.45) (1.44) 
Number of observations 3210420 1399665 1399665 3210420 1399665 1399665 
R-squared 0.015 0.093 0.093 - - - 
Standard errors in parentheses       
* p<0.05  ** p<0.01  *** p<0.001 
 
We also check whether the treatment effect of the FTA with China depends on a 
firm’s size as measured by its employment. In Column (3) we include the triple 
interaction term, , to estimate the 
effect of a firm’s size on export flows to China after the FTA in 2011. However, unlike 
for DR-CAFTA, we did not find that a firm’s size affects the treatment effect of the FTA 
with China. The coefficients on both interaction terms are not significant in the extended 
model. This result is robust to the alternative PPML specification.   
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Conclusion 
We employ the difference-in-difference estimation framework for the traditional 
gravity model of trade to quantify empirically the effects of the two most recent FTA 
between Costa Rica and its trading partners, the Dominican Republic-Central America 
FTA (DR-CAFTA) in 2009 and the FTA with China in 2011. 
Our main empirical result suggests that the implementation of DR-CAFTA in 2009 
increased export volume to the partner countries only for relatively large Costa Rican 
exporters (with larger than the median value of employment size).  This result is fairly 
consistent with similar studies looking at the effects of FTAs or the utilization of FTAs.  
The results from these studies point to the need to increase the awareness and 
dissemination on the FTAs to small and medium enterprises. The FTA with China in 
2011 did not seem to benefit Costa Rican exporters, at least within a year after its 
implementation.  This may be because of the short period of time since the 
implementation of the FTA with China, we cannot detect any changes in export 
behavior of firms mainly due to the data limitations. 
 
V. Innovation Capabilities in Costa Rica 
Building up of an innovation capability is thought as a way to escape from the 
middle-income trap.  In this regard, Costa Rica still has a long way to go.  Often 
research and development (R&D) spending as a share of GDP is used to measure the 
inputs that are used for innovation.  In this metric, Costa Rica is spending only about 
0.5% of GDP on R&D, which is much lower than that of Korea which has joined high 
income status in 1995 (see Figure 3).12  It is even lower compared to Malaysia which is 
also in the same income category as Costa Rica. 
 
Figure 3: R&D spending as a share of GDP in Korea, Malaysia, and Costa Rica, 1996-2011 
                                                 
12 Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Taiwan are the forerunners of star performers in East Asia.  They 
all made it to high income status, riding on the electronics and semiconductor boom.  On their growth 
experience, see for instance, Mathews and Cho (2000), Amsden (1989), and Amsden and Chu (2003).   
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Source: Created by the author using data from World Development Indicators 
 
R&D spending is a measure of input and because of this, R&D spending may 
not accurately reflect the innovation outcomes.  A number of patents granted are a 
much better measure to actually assess the innovation outcome.  However, since there 
exist differences among patent offices in different countries, here we utilize the data 
from the US Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) so as to control for the differences 
in patent examination.  Using this measure, one can see that patenting activities by 
Costa Rica is still rather low, even compared to Thailand (see Figure 4). 
 
Figure 4: Comparison of a number of patents granted at USPTO between Costa Rica and Thailand, 
1963-2011 
Costa Rica Thailand 
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Source: Created by the author using data from the US Patent and Trademark Office. 
 
The patenting at USPTO can be used as a leading indicator to assess whether a 
country will be stuck in a middle-income trap.  For instance, Korea and Taiwan made 
their transition to high income category in 1995 and 1993, respectively.  Prior to their 
transition in to high income category, patenting activities have increased significantly 
(see Figure 5).  Unfortunately, this kind of take off in innovation output is not seen yet 
in Costa Rica. 
 
Figure 5: Comparison of a number of patents granted at USPTO between Korea and Taiwan, 
1963-2011 
Korea Taiwan 
  
Source: Created by the author using data from the US Patent and Trademark Office. 
Note: The vertical bar indicate the year when these countries were classified as high income. 
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Future dictions: 
Given the current conditions facing Costa Rica, what should Costa Rica do?  
Table 18 lists suggested policy focus areas differentiated by the time horizon.  In the 
short-run, continuing efforts to expand FTA and attraction to FDI will be important.  
In order to do so, Costa Rica needs to maintain the existing strengths that were 
responsible for the success in attracting FDI: political and macroeconomic stability, and 
availability of human capital.  Political and macroeconomic stability is the most 
important pre-conditions for economic growth.  In terms of macroeconomic 
management, fiscal conditions needs to be in order.   In many countries, 
macroeconomic management is faltering because of the global economic slowdown. 
Costa Rica has been actively seeking FTAs.  However, currently only large 
firms seems to benefit from FTAs. A better understanding of the lack of utilization by 
smaller firms is needed and policy support and assistance needs to be provided. 
 
Table 18: Policy focus areas 
Short-run  Continuing efforts to expand FTA 
 Continuing attraction of FDI 
Medium-run  Development of local industries that are attached to global supply chain 
 Improvements in investment climate, logistics 
Long-run  Further development of human capital 
 
Continuing attraction of potential MNCs producing relatively higher 
value-added goods that are less exposed to the previous waves of globalization such as 
medical devices are good options for Costa Rica.  However, this effort to attract FDI 
needs to be complemented by broadening exporting activities by domestic firms to 
deepen industrialization and to assist development of support industries.   
To some extent, Costa Rica should consider better coordination among various 
development projects.  A more coordinated approach will bring higher payoffs than 
pursuing these individually.  This is especially so for logistics infrastructure since the 
key to modern logistics is the development of multimodal transport.  The attention to 
seaports needs to be complemented by improvements in road and rail infrastructure.  
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In addition, to better utilize the expanded capacity of the port facility, development of 
an industrial estate near the new port should be explored.  
By far the most important and most durable source of growth for Costa Rica 
would be continuing emphasis on human capital development.  The fact that emigration 
rates are relatively low, Costa Rica being an attractive location and continuous inflow of 
tourists all suggest that investment in human capital will be beneficial since Costa Rica 
would face less likelihood of brain drain.  However, given the small size of Costa Rica, 
investment in human capital also needs to be focused and efficient.  This means that 
communication and sharing of information among government, business, and education 
sectors needs to be frequent and well-coordinated.  For instance, information about 
labor requirements can be collected systematically from MNCs and make projections 
(one year ahead, 5 years, 10 years ahead) of labor demand.13  For this projection to 
work, coordination with educational institutes is needed. In addition, having regular 
forums in which government, universities, and private sectors (including MNCs) can 
exchange their views on future labor requirement will be beneficial.  These three 
bodies need to work together to ensure that Costa Rica can supply necessary and qualified 
human capital when needed. 
Improving the quality of tertiary education and above in science and engineering 
fields, especially in labs (a number of firms expressed the lack of hands-on experience 
as one key shortcomings of new hire) as well as statistics, materials and biomedical 
sciences, and good understanding on GMP. 
In pursuing its development goals, Costa Rica should be mindful of its 
reputation as an environmentally friendly place.  In the short-term, attention to this 
may raise the costs of investment.  However, if looking at long-term competitiveness 
and the distinctiveness of Costa Rica, the country needs to adhere to the sustainability 
orientation.  Otherwise, Costa Rica would run the risk of becoming like other small 
“brown” countries, vying for FDI without much to distinguish itself.  Costa Rica can 
show to the other countries that even focusing on sustainable development, a country 
can post high growth rates and achieve high levels of income. 
                                                 
13 See Rasiah (2002) for the experience of Malaysia and Mori, Nguyen and Pham (2009) on Vietnam. 
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Appendix 
 
Table 1. Export by Destination Market for 2008-2012 
Market Export in bil. USD 
United States 17.934 
Netherlands 3.357 
Panama 2.454 
China 2.262 
Hong Kong 2.229 
Nicaragua 2.075 
Guatemala 1.910 
Honduras 1.559 
Belgium 1.507 
El Salvador 1.360 
Mexico 1.330 
Dominican Republic 1.016 
United Kingdom 0.957 
Malaysia 0.860 
Puerto Rico 0.826 
Germany 0.763 
Italy 0.709 
France 0.416 
Japan 0.415 
Taiwan 0.371 
Canada 0.352 
Spain 0.313 
Republic of Korea 0.288 
Trinidad and Tobago 0.270 
Colombia 0.270 
Bolivarian Republic 0.255 
Singapore 0.196 
Ireland 0.195 
Portugal 0.193 
Jamaica 0.191 
Ecuador 0.170 
Australia 0.169 
Sweden 0.165 
Brazil 0.162 
Russian Federation 0.158 
India 0.134 
Chile 0.132 
Peru 0.107 
Cuba 0.103 
Netherlands Anti 0.083 
Argentina 0.071 
Viet Nam 0.069 
unknown 0.067 
Bahamas 0.063 
Turkey 0.061 
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Barbados 0.061 
Democratic Peopl 0.061 
Haiti 0.060 
Philippines 0.051 
Belize 0.043 
Suriname 0.040 
Greece 0.034 
Israel 0.034 
Thailand 0.032 
Saudi Arabia 0.030 
Aruba 0.029 
Cameroon 0.028 
Norway 0.024 
Indonesia 0.023 
Finland 0.020 
United Arab Emir 0.020 
Switzerland 0.018 
Guyana 0.015 
Islamic Republic 0.013 
Martinique 0.011 
Guadeloupe 0.010 
Denmark 0.010 
Poland 0.010 
Bermuda 0.010 
South Africa 0.010 
Uruguay 0.009 
Saint Lucia 0.009 
Cayman Island 0.008 
Bolivia 0.007 
Hungary 0.007 
Mozambique 0.006 
New Zealand 0.006 
Antigua & Barbuda 0.005 
Romania 0.005 
Morocco 0.005 
Austria 0.004 
Libya 0.004 
Dominica 0.004 
Tunisia 0.003 
Ukraine 0.003 
Saint Kitts and Nevis 0.003 
Lebanon 0.003 
Bulgaria 0.003 
Grenada 0.003 
Malawi 0.003 
Paraguay 0.002 
Egypt 0.002 
French Guiana 0.002 
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 0.002 
Ghana 0.002 
Cote dlvorire 0.002 
41 
 
Slovenia 0.002 
Sri Lanka 0.002 
Virgin Islands, 0.002 
Oman 0.001 
Pakistan 0.001 
Gabon 0.001 
Latvia 0.001 
Eritrea 0.001 
Nigeria 0.001 
Cambodia 0.001 
Yemen 0.001 
Qatar 0.001 
Andorra 0.001 
Reunion 0.001 
Slovakia 0.001 
Angola 0.001 
Zambia 0.001 
Lithuania 0.001 
Bosnia and Herze 0.001 
Tanzania 0.001 
Afghanistan 0.001 
Myanmar 0.001 
Kenya 0.000 
French Polynesia 0.000 
New Caledonia 0.000 
Bangladesh 0.000 
Syrian Arab Repu 0.000 
Albania 0.000 
Congo 0.000 
Curacao 0.000 
Czech Republic 0.000 
Iceland 0.000 
Ethiopia 0.000 
Georgia 0.000 
Jordan 0.000 
Cyprus 0.000 
Kuwait 0.000 
Papua New Guinea 0.000 
Armenia 0.000 
Turks and Caicos 0.000 
Malta 0.000 
Luxembourg 0.000 
Mongolia 0.000 
Gibraltar 0.000 
Guam 0.000 
Holy See 0.000 
Virgin Islands 0.000 
Uganda 0.000 
Pitcairn 0.000 
United States Mi 0.000 
Senegal 0.000 
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Sao Tome and Pri 0.000 
Algeria 0.000 
Sierra Leone 0.000 
The Democratic R 0.000 
Togo 0.000 
Iraq 0.000 
Croatia 0.000 
Federal States o 0.000 
Burundi 0.000 
Saint Pierre and 0.000 
Mayotte 0.000 
Macao 0.000 
Bahrain 0.000 
Benin 0.000 
Monaco 0.000 
Anguilla 0.000 
Saint Helena, As 0.000 
Mauritania 0.000 
Macedonia 0.000 
Liberia 0.000 
Mauritius 0.000 
Heard Island and 0.000 
Palau 0.000 
Equatorial Guine 0.000 
Fiji 0.000 
Liechtenstein 0.000 
Mali 0.000 
Zimbabwe 0.000 
Maldives 0.000 
Uzbekistan 0.000 
Kazakhstan 0.000 
Belarus 0.000 
Yugoslavia 0.000 
Niue 0.000 
Vanuatu 0.000 
Burkina Faso 0.000 
Tajikistan 0.000 
Central African 0.000 
Swaziland 0.000 
Rwanda 0.000 
Samoa 0.000 
Source: PROCOMER’s data 
 
